The migration to post-quantum cryptography is being held back by buggy servers that do not correctly implement TLS. Due to a bug, these servers reject connections that use post-quantum-secure cryptography, instead of negotiating classical cryptography if they do not support post-quantum cryptography.

What is the bug?

The Internet is currently beginning a migration to post-quantum secure cryptography. This migration is important because large-scale quantum computers will be powerful enough to break most public-key cryptosystems currently in use and compromise digital communications on the Internet and elsewhere. It is important to migrate to cryptography that cannot be broken by a quantum computer before quantum computers exist.

Unfortunately, some buggy servers are not prepared for clients to start supporting post-quantum-secure cryptography. The TLS protocol contains a mechanism for the server and client to negotiate the cryptographic algorithms used for the connection based on which algorithms are mutally supported by both. This means that correctly-implemented servers that have not yet added support for the draft post-quantum algorithms should silently ignore the post-quantum option, and select a different classical algorithm.

TLS ClientHello messages that offer post-quantum cryptography are larger than classical ClientHello messages, and exceed the threshold for transmission in a single packet. This means that a single call to TCP read() might not return the entire ClientHello packet. This has always been possible in TCP, but it is exacerbated by the larger ClientHello messages. Most buggy servers are not prepared to have to call read() more than once to read the entire ClientHello. This is still a bug even prior to the post-quantum migration, however, the bug is much more commonly exposed when the larger post-quantum cryptography is in use.

What is post-quantum-secure cryptography?

Modern public-key cryptography is secure in the face of a classical computer, but can be broken by a quantum computer. Luckily, quantum computers don't exist yet!

Post-quantum-secure cryptography (also shortened to post-quantum cryptography) is cryptography that is resistant to quantum computers. Due to the power of math, we can design, build, and verify this cryptography using only classical (non-quantum) computers.

NIST recently ran a competition to find the best post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, and is in the process of standardizing the winners. Some of the winning post-quantum cryptographic algorithms include Kyber for key exchange and key encapsulation, and Dilithium for digital signatures. The IETF is standardizing how to integrate this cryptography into TLS.

Why is this happening now?

Future quantum computers pose a risk to current Internet traffic through store-then-decrypt attacks, in which attackers harvest encrypted sensitive information now, and then decrypt it later, once quantum computers exist. Mitigating this threat requires deploying a post-quantum key exchange mechanism now.

To start mitigating the store-then-decrypt attack, Chrome is in the process of rolling out a post-quantum key exchange.

What is the status of post-quantum cryptography in browsers?

Post-quantum key exchange is rolling out in browsers. See Deployment.

What about authentication?

Quantum computers are capable of breaking the digital signature algorithms used for authenticating digital communications today. Post-quantum signature algorithms exist, but still have performance issues that make them difficult to integrate into existing authentication systems, such as HTTPS certificates (X.509). Luckily, unlike key exchange, the risk to authentication from a quantum computer requires a sufficiently powerful quantum computer to actually exist, since connections are authenticated in realtime. The store-then-decrypt attack does not apply to authentication algorithms.

This means the migration to post-quantum secure authentication algorithms is less urgent than key exchange. Due to the slow moving nature of the authentication ecosystems on the Internet, such as the Web PKI, it is important to start this migration soon. However, there is no urgent threat to authentication, like there is with key exchange.

Does this bug apply to classical cryptography?

Servers that are not prepared for a ClientHello may incorrectly reject any connection, especially if it split over two packets. This is less likely with classical cryptography, but can happen. You can test for this by sending "half" a ClientHello, and then waiting before sending the rest, and seeing if the server correctly handles the connection, or if it resets the connection. This bug is not specific to post-quantum cryptography, but is exacerbated by it.

How does this affect the migration to post-quantum cryptography?

TLS contains a mechanism for negotiating the cryptographic algorithms used for the connection. If things were working correctly, servers that don't support postquantum cryptography would select a classical algorithm. Unfortunately, these buggy servers fail on connections that offer postquantum cryptography. This means clients cannot start the rollout of postquantum cryptography without risking breaking access to sites hosted on buggy servers.

I'm not migrating to post-quantum cryptography until later. Why do I need to do anything now?

You should still make sure your server doesn't have this bug, especially if you're a server implementor. Clients are starting to deploy post-quantum cryptography, and while you don't need to update your server to support draft standards, you don't want to prevent clients from being able to start this transition, even if you aren't planning on participating right now.

How can I tell if my server has this bug?

The best way to test your server is to use this Python script to test your server. Alternatively, enable chrome://flags/#enable-tls13-kyber and then attempt to make an HTTPS connection to your server from Chrome. If the connection fails with ERR_CONNECTION_RESET or similar, the server is buggy. However, it is more likely that network conditions may mask the bug when testing with Chrome, rather than the Python script.

Does this bug apply to QUIC?

The QUIC protocol explicitly does not assume a single-packet ClientHello. While it is technically possible to have this bug, it's much less likely due to the nature of UDP. Also:

QUIC is much newer so there's less long of a tail of buggy endpoints and middleware to worry about
QUIC is typically deployed with a TCP fallback/race, so intolerance would look like a TCP fallback and be "fine"

How do I patch the bug if I'm an implementor?

TLS messages contain a two-byte record length field at byte index 3. When processing a ClientHello, servers should ensure they've called read() until the connection has returned the full content of the message, as set in the length field. If read() returns less bytes than the length of the message, servers should loop until they've read the entire message.

I'm a network administrator? How does this affect me?

You may be using a vendor that has buggy servers or a buggy middlebox. You should contact your vendor and request that they patch their software. You can provide this website for more information.

Why are you calling this `tldr.fail`?

The bug is that servers "didn't read" the whole ClientHello, likely because it was "too long" for a single packet, and then erroneously "fail" the connection.

This isn't a vulnerability, why do you have a website?

This bug appears in a lot of servers and is holding back the Internet's migration to post-quantum secure cryptography. If things were operating correctly, clients could deploy support for post-quantum cryptography and then servers would slowly opt-in. Instead, we're stuck, because buggy servers are rejecting connections from properly implemented clients that deploy post-quantum cryptography. These clients are then unable to load sites served by the buggy server. This site serves as a reference for why the bug is important, and how to identify and fix it.

Deployment

Browser	Windows	Mac	Linux	ChromeOS	Android	iOS
Chrome	Chrome 124	Chrome 124	Chrome 124	Chrome 124	1% since Chrome 131	n/a¹
Firefox	`about:config`	`about:config`	`about:config`	n/a²	`about:config`	n/a¹
Safari	Unavailable	Unavailable	Unavailable	n/a²	n/a³	Unavailable

Known Incompatibilities

Product	Status	Discovered	Via	Patched	Links
Vercel	✅	2023-08-15	Chrome Beta	2023-08-23	Twitter
ZScalar	✅	2023-08-17	Chrome Beta	2023-09-28
Cisco		2024-04-23	Chrome 124	Unknown	Cisco Bug
Envoy	✅	2024-04-29	Chrome 124	n/a (config-only )	Github
Ingress Nginx	❌⁴	2024-06-03	Chrome 124		Github
Lightspeed Rocket		2024-07-16	Chrome 124	Unknown⁵
Palo Alto		2024-10-25	Golang	Unknown⁶	Github
Apache Trafficserver	❌	2024-11-13	Chrome		Github

Table last updated 2024-11-13

All browsers on iOS internally use WebKit, and so the rollout is dependent on Apple. ↩︎ ↩︎
There is no Firefox or Safari for ChromeOS. ↩︎ ↩︎
There is no Safari for Android. ↩︎
Only affects TLS passthrough. Using ingress-nginx to terminate TLS is not affected. ↩︎
Older devices are affected. New devices may or may not be affected. ↩︎
This may only affect certain PA products, and certain version ranges. Details unknown. ↩︎